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Secure UAV Communication with CoMP
Reception
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Abstract
This paper studies a secrecy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) communication system with coor-
dinated multi-point (CoMP) reception, in which one UAV sends confidential messages to a set of
cooperative ground receivers (GRs), in the presence of several suspicious eavesdroppers. In particular,
we consider two types of eavesdroppers that are non-colluding and colluding, respectively. Under this
setup, we exploit the UAV’s maneuver in three dimensional (3D) space together with transmit power
adaptation for optimizing the secrecy communication performance. First, we consider the quasi-stationary
UAV scenario, in which the UAV is placed at a fixed but optimizable location during the communication
period. In this scenario, we jointly optimize the UAV’s 3D placement and transmit power control to
maximize the secrecy rate. Under both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, we obtain the optimal
solutions to the joint 3D placement and transmit power control problems in well structures. Next, we
consider the mobile UAV scenario, in which the UAV has a mission to fly from an initial location to a final
location during the communication period. In this scenario, we jointly optimize the UAV’s 3D trajectory
and transmit power allocation to maximize the average secrecy rate during the whole communication
period. To deal with the difficult joint 3D trajectory and transmit power allocation problems, we present
alternating-optimization-based approaches to obtain high-quality solutions. Finally, we provide numerical
results to validate the performance of our proposed designs. It is shown that due to the consideration
of CoMP reception, our proposed design with 3D maneuver significantly outperforms the conventional
design with two dimensional (2D) (horizontal) maneuver only, by exploiting the additional degrees of
freedom in altitudes. It is also shown that the non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers lead to distinct
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3D UAV maneuver behaviors, e.g., under colluding eavesdroppers, the UAV should fly farther apart from
them (than that under the non-colluding ones) for avoiding their collaborative interception.
Index Terms
UAV communications, physical layer security, coordinated multi-point (CoMP) reception, 3D ma-
neuver, power adaptation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are envisioned to play an important role in beyond fifth-
generation (B5G) and sixth-generation (6G) cellular networks [2]. On one hand, UAVs with
certain missions such as cargo delivery and aerial inspection can be connected seamlessly with
on-ground cellular base stations (BSs), in order to increase the communication and operation
range, and enhance the quality of service [3–7]. On the other hand, UAVs can also be employed
as aerial wireless platforms (e.g., BSs, relays, and wireless chargers) in the sky to provide flexible
and on-demand wireless services to ground users, with both improved transmission efficiency and
enhanced coverage (see, e.g., [8–15] and the references therein). With the emergence of cellular-
connected UAVs and UAV-assisted wireless transmissions, various technical opportunities and
challenges have been imposed. First, UAVs in the sky normally have strong line-of-sight (LoS)
air-to-ground (A2G) links with on-ground nodes. This leads to better A2G communication quality
but also stronger A2G interference. Next, UAVs have high mobility in the three-dimensional
(3D) space. This makes the mobility management a difficult task, but also provides a new
design degree of freedom for improving the communication performance via UAV placement or
trajectory control.
Among others, the security issue is another critical challenge faced in UAV communications.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels and the existence of strong LoS components over
A2G links, the transmitted signals from UAVs in the sky are more vulnerable to be eavesdropped
by suspicious nodes on the ground than conventional terrestrial communications. Physical layer
security has been recognized as a viable solution to protect wireless communications against
eavesdropping attacks (see, e.g., [16, 17] and the references therein). Different from conventional
cryptology-based security technology, physical layer security is able to provide perfect security
for wireless communication systems from an information theoretical perspective. Therefore, to
provide secure UAV communications, it is emerging and of great importance to conduct research
on using physical layer security for securing UAV communications.
In the literature, there have been various prior works investigating the integration of physical
layer security in UAV communications and networks (see, e.g., [18–31]). In general, these works
can be roughly classified into two categories that considered the network-level performance
analysis for large-scale random UAV networks via stochastic geometry [18–20], and the link-
level performance optimization via UAV maneuver design and wireless resource allocation [21–
31], respectively. In particular, we focus on the UAV maneuver design for optimizing the link-
level performance. Intuitively speaking, by exploiting the controllable mobility in 3D space,
legitimate UAV transmitters can fly close to intended ground receivers (GRs) to improve the
legitimate channel quality and move far away from suspicious eavesdroppers to prevent the
information leakage, thus improving the security of legitimate transmission. For instance, [21–
26] considered the scenario with one UAV communicating with one GR or acting as a mobile
relay in the presence of one eavesdropper, in which the UAV’s trajectory and power allocation are
jointly optimized for maximizing the secrecy rate. [27–31] then considered the scenario when one
UAV’s legitimate communication is assisted by the other UAV’s cooperative jamming, in which
the communicating and jamming UAVs jointly design their trajectories and power allocations
for further improving the secrecy performance. Nevertheless, these existing works on secrecy
UAV communications mainly focused on the scenario with each GR independently decoding the
respective messages without cooperation, under which the UAV is considered to fly at a fixed
altitude with only two-dimensional (2D) horizontal trajectory optimized.
Recently, the coordinated multi-point (CoMP) transmission/reception has been recognized
as a promising technique in wireless networks [32–35], which enables symbol-level cooper-
ation among geographically distributed nodes (such as BSs) to increase the communication
performance via utilizing the inter-cell interference. It is well established that CoMP is able
to significantly enhance the communication reliability and increase the data-rate throughput
for both cell-center and cell-edge users [32–35], and also increase the secrecy communication
performance [36]. Therefore, it is expected that the exploitation of CoMP can also enhance the
performance of secrecy UAV communications. Nevertheless, how to optimally design the UAV
maneuver for secrecy UAV communication under CoMP has not been studied in the literature
yet. This thus motivates our investigation in this work.
In this paper, we consider the secrecy UAV communication with CoMP reception over a finite
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the secrecy UAV communication system with CoMP reception, in the presence of several suspicious
eavesdroppers.
communication period, in which one UAV communicates with multiple cooperative legitimate
GRs, in the presence of multiple suspicious eavesdroppers. With CoMP, these GRs are enabled
to cooperatively decode the legitimate messages sent from the UAV to defend against the eaves-
dropping attack. In particular, we consider two types of eavesdroppers that are non-colluding and
colluding, respectively. Different from previous works that focused on 2D (horizontal) maneuver,
we further exploit the vertical maneuver (or equivalently, altitude) via 3D placement/trajectory
design, together with the transmit power adaptation, to facilitate the secure UAV communication.
Under this setup, the main results of this paper are summarized as follows.
• First, we consider the quasi-stationary UAV scenario, in which the UAV is placed at a
fixed but optimizable location during the communication period. In this scenario, we jointly
optimize the UAV’s 3D placement and transmit power control to maximize the secrecy rate,
subject to the UAV’s minimum/maximum altitude and maximum transmit power constraints.
Although the formulated secrecy rate maximization problems under non-colluding and
colluding eavesdroppers are both non-convex, we propose efficient methods to obtain the
optimal solutions in well structures.
• Next, we consider the mobile UAV scenario, in which the UAV has a mission to fly from
an initial location to a final location during the communication period. In this scenario, we
jointly optimize the UAV’s 3D trajectory and transmit power allocation to maximize the
average secrecy rate during the whole communication period, subject to its maximum flight
speed and maximum transmit power constraints. Due to the coupling between transmit
power and trajectory variables, the formulated secrecy rate maximization problems are
non-convex, which are very difficult to be solved optimally. To tackle this difficulty, we
propose alternating-optimization-based approaches to optimize the transmit power allocation
and trajectory design alternately, by using the convex optimization and successive convex
approximation (SCA) techniques, respectively.
• Finally, we provide numerical results to validate the performance of our proposed designs.
It is shown that the joint 3D maneuver and transmit power optimization greatly enhances
the secrecy communication performance under our setup, as compared to other benchmark
schemes with e.g. 2D maneuver optimization only. It is also shown that the 3D maneuver
behaviors under non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers are distinct, where the UAV
generally should fly farther apart from the eavesdroppers (for avoiding the collaborative
interception) if they are colluding, but the UAV may fly relatively closer to them (to combat
against their individual eavesdropping) if they are non-colluding.
It is worth pointing out that in the literature, the 3D placement and/or trajectory design has
been investigated in UAV communications under other setups [37–40] (instead of secrecy UAV
communications with CoMP reception in this paper). For example, [37, 38] optimized the UAVs’
3D placement design for serving ground users more cost-effectively. [39] investigated the joint
design of 3D trajectory and resource allocation for maximizing the system sum throughput in
solar-powered UAV communication systems, in which the UAV can adjust its vertical locations
for balancing between the harvested solar power level versus the communication channel quality.
[40] considered the spectrum sharing between a cognitive UAV communication system and a
coexisting primary terrestrial communications, in which the 3D UAV trajectory is controlled to
balance between the cognitive communication performance versus the A2G interference towards
the primary terrestrial system. To our best knowledge, our proposed 3D maneuver design for
secure UAV communications with CoMP reception is new and has not been studied yet.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model of our
considered CoMP reception-enabled secrecy UAV communication system. Section III optimizes
the 3D placement and transmit power control to maximize the secrecy rate in the quasi-stationary
UAV scenario. Section IV optimizes the 3D trajectory and transmit power allocation to maximize
the average secrecy rate in the mobile UAV scenario. Section V presents numerical results to
validate the secrecy communication performance of our proposed designs. Finally, Section VI
concludes this paper.
TABLE I
LIST OF NOTATIONS
K Number of GRs
K Set of GRs
J Number of eavesdroppers
J Set of eavesdroppers
T Duration of the communication period of interest
N Number of time slots
N Set of time slots
ts Duration of each time slot
wbk Horizontal location of GR k
wej Horizontal location of eavesdropper j
β0 Channel power gain at a reference distance of 1 m
dbk Distance from UAV to GR k
dej Distance from UAV to eavesdropper j
(x, y, z) 3D location of UAV
q Horizontal location of UAV
zmin Minimum flight altitude of UAV
zmax Maximum flight altitude of UAV
g˜bk Channel power gain from UAV to GR k
g˜ej Channel power gain from UAV to eavesdropper j
p Transmit power of UAV
P Maximum power level of UAV in quasi-stationary UAV scenario
Ppeak Maximum peak transmit power of UAV in mobile UAV scenario
Pave Maximum average transmit power of UAV in mobile UAV scenario
s Transmitted signal by UAV
ybk Received signal at GR k
yej Received signal at eavesdropper j
nbk AWGN at receiver of each individual GR k
nej AWGN at receiver of each individual eavesdropper j
γbk Received SNR at GR k
γej Received SNR at eavesdropper j
gbk Channel-power-to-noise ratio from UAV to GR k
gej Channel-power-to-noise ratio from UAV to eavesdropper j
γb Received SNR at GRs with CoMP reception
γ
(I)
e Received SNR at non-colluding eavesdroppers
γ
(II)
e Received SNR at colluding eavesdroppers
R(I) Secrecy rate under non-colluding eavesdroppers
R(II) Secrecy rate under colluding eavesdroppers
V˜ Maximum horizontal flight speed of UAV
V Maximum horizontal displacement of UAV
V˜up Maximum vertical ascending speed of UAV
V˜down Maximum vertical descending speed of UAV
Vup Maximum vertical ascending displacement of UAV
Vdown Maximum vertical descending displacement of UAV
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this work, we consider the secrecy UAV communication system as shown in Fig. 1, in
which one UAV communicates with K GRs in the presence of J suspicious eavesdroppers on
the ground. This may practically correspond to the cellular-connected UAV scenario with the
GRs being ground BSs that can cooperate in CoMP reception to jointly decode the legitimate
messages sent from the UAV. We focus on a particular UAV communication period with duration
T in second (s). Without loss of generality, we consider a 3D Cartesian coordinate system with the
fixed horizontal location of GR k beingwbk ∈ R2, k ∈ K , {1, . . . , K}, and that of eavesdropper
j being wej ∈ R2, j ∈ J , {1, . . . , J}. It is assumed that the UAV perfectly knows the locations
of both GRs and eavesdroppers a-priori.1 This assumption is made for the purpose of facilitating
the joint maneuver and power control design, and gaining essential design insights. In practice,
the GRs’ locations can be acquired by the UAV via the GRs reporting such information; while
the eavesdroppers’ locations may be obtained by the UAV via monitoring the eavesdroppers’
emitted signals (if the eavesdroppers belong to a different network entity as the UAV) [41]2, or
via a centralized network controller reporting such information (if the eavesdroppers belong to
the same network entity as the UAV) [43]. For convenience, we summarize the main notations
used in this paper in Table I. In the following, we consider two scenarios with quasi-stationary
and mobile UAVs, respectively.
A. Quasi-Stationary UAV Scenario
First, we consider the quasi-stationary UAV scenario, in which the UAV is placed at a fixed but
optimizable location (x, y, z) over the whole duration-T communication period. For notational
convenience, let q = (x, y) denote the horizontal location of the UAV, and z denote its vertical
location or altitude, respectively. Let zmin and zmax denote the minimally and maximally allowed
UAV flight altitudes, respectively, with zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax, which are set for safety reasons
based on certain regulations. As A2G channels from the UAV to ground nodes (both GRs
and eavesdroppers) normally have strong LoS links, we consider a LoS channel model with a
1Notice that our results are extendible to the case when the UAV only has partial knowledge of the GRs’ and/or eavesdroppers’
locations, by e.g. using the robust optimization techniques based on bounded location error models (see, e.g., [28]).
2Even if the eavesdroppers are passive in reception only, it is possible to detect the passive eavesdropping from the local
oscillator power leaked from the eavesdroppers’ RF front end [42].
generic path loss exponent α with α ∈ [2, 4] in general. Accordingly, the channel power gain
from the UAV to each GR k ∈ K is given by
g˜bk (q, z) =
β0
dαbk (q, z)
=
β0
(||q −wbk||2 + z2)
α
2
, (1)
where β0 denotes the channel power gain at the reference distance of 1 meter (m) and dbk (q, z)
denotes the distance from the UAV to GR k. Similarly, the channel power gain from the UAV
to eavesdropper j ∈ J is
g˜ej (q, z) =
β0
dαej (q, z)
=
β0
(||q −wej||2 + z2)
α
2
, (2)
where dej (q, z) denotes the distance from the UAV to eavesdropper j. Let p ≥ 0 denote the
transmit power by the UAV, which is subject to a maximum power level P . Accordingly, we
have
0 ≤ p ≤ P. (3)
Next, we consider the secure communication from the UAV to the K legitimate GRs. Let s
denote the UAV’s transmitted signal that is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian (CSCG)
random variable with zero mean and unit variance, i.e., s ∼ CN (0, 1). In this case, the received
signals at each GR k ∈ K and eavesdropper j ∈ J are respectively given as
ybk =
√
g˜bk (q, z) ps+ nbk, (4)
yej =
√
g˜ej (q, z) ps + nej, (5)
where nbk and nej denote the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the receivers of GR k
and eavesdropper j, respectively, each with zero mean and variance σ2, i.e., nbk ∼ CN (0, σ2),
nej ∼ CN (0, σ2). Then, the received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at each individual GR k ∈ K
and eavesdropper j ∈ J are respectively given as
γbk (q, z, p) = g˜bk (q, z) p/σ
2 = gbk (q, z) p, (6)
γej (q, z, p) = g˜ej (q, z) p/σ
2 = gej (q, z) p, (7)
where for notational convenience, gbk (q, z) = g˜bk (q, z) /σ
2 and gej (q, z) = g˜ej (q, z) /σ
2
are defined as the channel-power-to-noise ratios from the UAV to GR k and eavesdropper j,
respectively.
With CoMP reception, the K GRs jointly decode the received legitimate message s via
maximal ratio combining (MRC). Accordingly, the received SNR at the GRs is given as
γb (q, z, p) =
∑
k∈K
γbk (q, z, p) =
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) p. (8)
In particular, we consider two types of eavesdroppers that are non-colluding and colluding,
namely Type-I and Type-II eavesdroppers, respectively. First, consider the non-colluding eaves-
droppers, which can only intercept/decode the confidential message from the UAV individually.
In this case, the received SNR at the non-colluding eavesdroppers is limited by the one with the
strongest signal, which is given by
γ(I)e (q, z, p) = max
j∈J
γej (q, z, p) = max
j∈J
gej (q, z) p. (9)
As a result, the secrecy rate from the UAV to the K GRs (in bits-per-second-per-Hertz, bps/Hz)
for the case of Type-I eavesdroppers is given by [28]
R(I) (q, z, p) =
[
log2 (1 + γb (q, z, p))− log2
(
1 + γ(I)e (q, z, p)
)]+
,
=
[
log2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) p
)
− log2
(
1 + max
j∈J
gej (q, z) p
)]+
, (10)
where [u]+ , max(u, 0). Next, consider the colluding eavesdroppers, which can cooperatively
intercept/decode the confidential message s from the UAV by combining their intercepted signals.
Hence, by using the MRC, the received SNR at the colluding eavesdroppers is equivalent to
γ(II)e (q, z, p) =
∑
j∈J
γej (q, z, p) =
∑
j∈J
gej (q, z) p. (11)
As a result, the secrecy rate from the UAV to the K GRs (in bps/Hz) for the case of Type-II
eavesdroppers is given by [28]
R(II) (q, z, p) =
[
log2 (1 + γb (q, z, p))− log2
(
1 + γ(II)e (q, z, p)
)]+
,
=
[
log2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) p
)
− log2
(
1 +
∑
j∈J
gej (q, z) p
)]+
. (12)
In the quasi-stationary UAV scenario, our objective is to jointly optimize the 3D UAV place-
ment q and z and the transmit power control p, to maximize the secrecy rate from the UAV to
GRs (i.e., R(i) (q, z, p) , i ∈ {I, II}), subject to the UAV’s minimum/maximum altitude constraints,
as well as the maximum transmit power constraint. For the case with Type-i eavesdroppers,
i ∈ {I, II}, the secrecy rate maximization problem is formulated as
(P1-i) :max
q,z,p
R(i) (q, z, p)
s.t. zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax
0 ≤ p ≤ P,
where each problem (P1-i) is for Type-i eavesdroppers, i ∈ {I, II}. Note that the objective
functions in both problems (P1-I) and (P1-II) are non-smooth (due to the operator [·]+) and
non-concave, with variables q, z, and p coupled. Therefore, problems (P1-I) and (P1-II) are
both non-convex and generally difficult to be optimally solved.
B. Mobile UAV Scenario
Next, we consider the mobile UAV scenario, in which the UAV has a mission to fly from an
initial location to a final location during the communication period with duration T . In this case,
we discretize the communication period into N time slots each with equal duration ts = T/N .
Let N , {1, . . . , N} denote the set of time slots. Let (x[n], y[n], z[n]) denote the UAV’s time-
varying 3D location at time slot n ∈ N , where q[n] = (x[n], y[n]) denotes its horizontal location,
and z[n] denotes its vertical location or altitude. Also, suppose that q[0] and q[N + 1] denote
the UAV’s pre-determined initial and final horizontal locations, and z[0] and z[N + 1] denote
the corresponding altitudes, respectively. Let V˜ denote the UAV’s maximum horizontal speed in
meters/second (m/s), and V = V˜ ts denote the maximum horizontal displacement of the UAV
between two consecutive slots. It then follows that
‖q[n+ 1]− q[n]‖ ≤ V, ∀n ∈ {0} ∪ N , (13)
where ‖·‖ denotes the Euclidean norm. Let V˜up and V˜down denote the maximum vertical ascending
and descending speeds, respectively. Then, we have Vup = V˜upts and Vdown = V˜downts as the
maximum vertical ascending and descending displacements, respectively. Furthermore, recall
that zmin and zmax denote the UAV’s minimally and maximally allowed altitudes, respectively.
Accordingly, we have
z[n + 1]− z[n] ≤ Vup, ∀n ∈ {0} ∪ N , (14a)
z[n]− z[n + 1] ≤ Vdown, ∀n ∈ {0} ∪ N , (14b)
zmin ≤ z[n] ≤ zmax, ∀n ∈ N . (14c)
We consider that the UAV can adaptively allocate its transmit power over the duration-T
communication period. Let p[n] ≥ 0 denote the transmit power by the UAV at slot n ∈ N .
Suppose that the UAV is subject to a maximum average power Pave and a maximum peak power
Ppeak, where Pave ≤ Ppeak holds in general. Then we have
1
N
∑
n∈N
p[n] ≤ Pave, (15a)
0 ≤ p[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n ∈ N . (15b)
Similar as in the quasi-stationary UAV scenario in Section II.A and with CoMP recep-
tion, the secrecy rate from the UAV to the K GRs at time slot n (in bps/Hz) is given by
R(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) in (10) for Type-I eavesdroppers, or R(II) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) in (12) for Type-
II eavesdroppers.
In the mobile UAV scenario, our objective is to jointly optimize the 3D UAV trajectory
{q[n], z[n]} and the transmit power allocation {p[n]} over time, to maximize the average secrecy
rate from the UAV to GRs over the whole duration-T communication period (i.e., 1
N
∑
n∈N R
(i) (q[n], z[n], p[n]),
under Type-i eavesdroppers, i ∈ {I, II}), subject to the UAV flight constraints in (13) and (14),
and the maximum power constraints in (15). The secrecy rate maximization problem under
Type-i eavesdroppers, i ∈ {I, II}, is thus formulated as
(P2-i) : max
{q[n],z[n],p[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R(i) (q[n], z[n], p[n])
s.t. (13), (14), and (15).
Note that each objective function in problems (P2-I) and (P2-II) contains a large number of
secrecy rate terms that are non-smooth (due to the operator [·]+) and non-concave, with variables
{q[n]}, {z[n]}, and {p[n]} coupled. Therefore, problems (P2-I) and (P2-II) are non-convex
optimization problems that are more difficult to be solved than problems (P1-I) and (P1-II).
In the next two sections, we will address the secrecy rate maximization problems (P1-I) and
(P1-II) for the quasi-stationary UAV scenario in Section III, and solve problems (P2-I) and (P2-II)
for the mobile UAV scenario in Section IV.
III. JOINT 3D PLACEMENT AND TRANSMIT POWER CONTROL IN QUASI-STATIONARY UAV
SCENARIO
In this section, we obtain the optimal solutions to problems (P1-I) and (P1-II) in the quasi-
stationary UAV scenario under non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, respectively.
A. Optimal Solution to Problem (P1-I) for Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
To solve problem (P1-I), we first handle the non-smoothness of the objective function. Accord-
ing to Lemma 1 in [22], the transmit power control in (P1-I) can always lead to a non-negative
secrecy rate, since otherwise, we can always set p = 0 to have a zero secrecy rate. Therefore,
problem (P1-I) can be equivalently reformulated as
(P1-I.1) :max
q,z,p
R¯(I) (q, z, p)
s.t. zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax
0 ≤ p ≤ P,
where
R¯(I) (q, z, p) = log2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) p
)
− log2
(
1 + max
j∈J
gej (q, z) p
)
. (16)
Next, we focus on solving problem (P1-I.1) that is still non-convex. Towards this end, we
first optimize the UAV’s altitude z and the transmit power p under any given horizontal location
q, and then find the optimal q via a 2D search.
In the following, we only need to focus on optimizing z and p under given q, for which the
optimization problem is simplified as
(P1-I.2) :max
p,z
R¯(I) (q, z, p)
s.t. zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax
0 ≤ p ≤ P.
For problem (P1-I.2), it is evident that the optimal transmit power solution of p can either be 0
or P . This is due to the fact that under any given z, if the effective legitimate communication
link is no weaker than the effective eavesdropping link, i.e.,
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) ≥ max
j∈J
gej (q, z), then
the objective function R¯(I) (q, z, p) in (16) is concave and monotonically non-decreasing with
respect to the transmit power p ≥ 0; while if
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) < max
j∈J
gej (q, z), R¯
(I) (q, z, p) in
(16) is a convex and monotonically decreasing function of p ≥ 0. Furthermore, notice that under
p = 0, the achieved secrecy rate is always zero, regardless of the UAV’s altitude z. Therefore, we
can solve problem (P1-I.2) by first optimizing z under p = P , and then comparing the obtained
maximum secrecy rate versus zero.
Now, we consider p = P , under which problem (P1-I.2) is simplified as
(P1-I.3) :max
z
R¯(I) (q, z, P )
s.t. zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax.
We then have the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The function R¯(I) (q, z, P ) is monotonically decreasing, or first increasing and then
decreasing, with respect to z ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof: This lemma can be easily verified by checking the first-derivative of R¯(I) (q, z, P )
with respect to z ∈ [0,+∞). Therefore, the details are omitted for brevity.
Based on Lemma 1, it is clear that the optimal UAV altitude z∗ to problem (P1-I.3) is unique,
which can be obtained by using a bisection method over zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax. Therefore, by
comparing R¯(I) (q, z∗, P ) with zero, we have the optimal solutions of p⋆ and z⋆ to problem
(P1-I.2) as follows.
p⋆ =


P, if R¯(I) (q, z∗, P ) > 0,
0, if R¯(I) (q, z∗, P ) ≤ 0,
z⋆


= z∗, if R¯(I) (q, z∗, P ) > 0,
∈ [zmin, zmax], if R¯(I) (q, z∗, P ) ≤ 0.
(17)
As a result, problem (P1-I.2) is solved. By combining the solution in (17) together with the 2D
search over q, the optimal solution to problem (P1-I.1) or equivalently (P1-I) is finally obtained.
Remark 3.1: First, we discuss the optimal solution to problem (P1-I.2) under given q to gain
more insights. Notice that under given q, if there exists one legitimate GR that is located closer
to the UAV than all the non-colluding eavesdroppers, i.e., min
k∈K
dbk (q, 0) ≤ min
j∈J
dej (q, 0) ,
3 (or
equivalently, there is at least one legitimate channel that is no weaker than the eavesdropping
channels), then it can be shown via checking the first-derivative of R¯(I) (q, z, P ) with respect
to z ∈ [0,+∞) that the optimal altitude z to problem (P1-I.2) is z⋆ = zmin. In other words,
the UAV should stay at the lowest altitude to enjoy the strongest legitimate channel gains.
Otherwise, if the UAV is located closer to one or more eavesdroppers than all legitimate GRs
(but
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) ≥ max
j∈J
gej (q, z) still holds), then it can be shown that at the optimality
of problem (P1-I.2), the UAV altitude may vary between the minimum and maximum values,
depending on its horizontal location q and the GRs’ and eavesdroppers’ distributions.
Remark 3.2: Next, we compare the optimal solution to problem (P1-I) in the special case
with K = 1 GR (without CoMP) versus that in the case with K > 1 GRs (with CoMP of our
interest). First, consider the special case with K = 1 GR to gain further insights. In this case, it
can be shown that at the optimal solution to problem (P1-I.2) under any given q, the UAV can
always stay at the lowest altitude z⋆ = zmin, even when gb1 (q, z) < max
j∈J
gej (q, z) (with zero
secrecy rate achieved). Therefore, at the optimal solution to problem (P1-I) with q optimized,
the UAV should also stay at the lowest altitude, with the optimized horizontal location closer to
the GR than all eavesdroppers to achieve a positive secrecy rate. By contrast, in our considered
CoMP case with K > 1 GRs, the UAV may stay at an optimized altitude higher than zmin with
the optimized horizontal location closer to some eavesdroppers than GRs, but still achieving
a positive secrecy rate. This indicates that controlling the UAV’s altitude is not beneficial for
enhancing secrecy UAV communication performance if CoMP reception is not employed at GRs,
but is very significant if CoMP reception is considered.
B. Optimal Solution to Problem (P1-II) for Colluding Eavesdroppers
Next, we consider problem (P1-II) for colluding eavesdroppers. Similarly as for (P1-I), we omit
the [·]+ operator in the objective function of (P1-II), and re-formulate (P1-II) as the following
3Notice that with min
k∈K
dbk (q, 0) ≤ min
j∈J
dej (q, 0), we have min
k∈K
dbk (q, z) ≤ min
j∈J
dej (q, z), and accordingly
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) >
max
j∈J
gej (q, z).
equivalent problem (P1-II.1).
(P1-II.1) :max
q,z,p
R¯(II) (q, z, p)
s.t. zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax
0 ≤ p ≤ P,
where
R¯(II) (q, z, p) = log2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
gbk (q, z) p
)
− log2
(
1 +
∑
j∈J
gej (q, z) p
)
. (18)
To solve problem (P1-II.1), we first optimize the UAV’s altitude z and transmit power p under
any given horizontal location q, and then find the optimal q via a 2D search.
Now, we optimize p and z under given q, for which the optimization problem is expressed as
(P1-II.2) :max
p,z
R¯(II) (q, z, p)
s.t. zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax
0 ≤ p ≤ P.
Similar to (P1-I.2), the optimal transmit power solution to problem (P1-II.2) is either 0 or full
power P . Therefore, to solve (P1-II.2), we only need to optimize z for problem (P1-II.2) under
p = P , and then compare the obtained secrecy rate versus zero. Under p = P , (P1-II.2) is
simplified as
(P1-II.3) :max
z
R¯(II) (q, z, P )
s.t. zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax.
It is observed from (18) that the objective function is a complicated function with respect
to the variable z, which can only be solved numerically. Note that R¯(II) (q, z, P ) is a bounded
continuous differentiable function with respect to z ∈ [zmin, zmax]. Therefore, we can check
the first derivative of R¯(II) (q, z, P ) and obtain all the real solutions to R¯(II) (q, z, P ) = 0. By
comparing the corresponding objective values under these solutions and boundary points (i.e.,
zmin and zmax), we can get the optimal value of z to problem (P1-II.3), denoted by z
∗∗.
Then, by comparing the obtained R¯(II) (q, z∗∗, P ) with zero, we have the optimal solution of
p⋆⋆ and z⋆⋆ to problem (P1-II.2) as
p⋆⋆ =


P, if R¯(II) (q, z∗∗, P ) > 0,
0, if R¯(II) (q, z∗∗, P ) ≤ 0,
z⋆⋆


= z∗∗, if R¯(II) (q, z∗∗, P ) > 0,
∈ [zmin, zmax], if R¯
(II) (q, z∗∗, P ) ≤ 0.
(19)
Finally, by combining p⋆⋆ and z⋆⋆ together with the 2D search for q, the optimal solution
to problem (P1-II) is finally obtained. Notice that as the secrecy rate function R(II) (q, z, p)
under colluding eavesdroppers is generally more complicated than R(I) (q, z, p) under non-
colluding eavesdroppers, it is difficult to analytically analyze the optimal solution to problem
(P1-II). Therefore, we will compare the optimal solutions under colluding and non-colluding
eavesdroppers in numerical results in Section V later.
IV. JOINT 3D TRAJECTORY AND TRANSMIT POWER ALLOCATION IN MOBILE UAV
SCENARIO
In this section, we propose efficient algorithms to solve problems (P2-I) and (P2-II) in the
mobile UAV scenario for both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, respectively.
A. Proposed Solution to (P2-I) for Non-colluding Eavesdroppers
First, we handle the non-smoothness of the objective function of problem (P2-I). Towards
this end, we omit the [·]+ operator in the objective function of (P2-I) similarly as in the quasi-
stationary UAV scenario in Section III.A, and re-express (P2-I) as the following equivalent
problem (P2-I.1).
(P2-I.1) : max
{q[n],z[n],p[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n])
s.t. (13), (14), and (15),
where R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) is defined in (16).
Next, we focus on solving problem (P2-I.1), which, however, is still non-convex. To tackle
this issue, we use the alternating optimization method to optimize the transmit power allocation
{p[n]} and UAV trajectory {q[n], z[n]} in an iterative manner, by considering the other to be
given.
1) Transmit Power Allocation Optimization: First, we optimize the UAV’s transmit power
{p[n]} under given UAV trajectory {q[n], z[n]}, for which the optimization problem is expressed
as
(P2-I.2) : max
{p[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) , s.t. (15).
Notice that under given {q[n]} and {z[n]}, R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) can be re-expressed as follows
for notational convenience
R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) = log2
(
1 + a(I)n p[n]
)
− log2
(
1 + b(I)n p[n]
)
, (20)
where a
(I)
n and b
(I)
n are constants given as a
(I)
n =
∑
k∈K
gbk (q[n], z[n]) , b
(I)
n = max
j∈J
gej (q[n], z[n]) .
It is evident that for problem (P2-I.2), under any time slot n ∈ N , if the effective legitimate
communication channel is stronger than the effective eavesdropping channel, i.e., a
(I)
n > b
(I)
n ,
then the rate function R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) is concave and monotonically increasing with respect
to the transmit power p[n] ≥ 0; otherwise, it can be easily shown that the maximum of
R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) is zero, which is attained at p[n] = 0. Therefore, we only need to consider
the transmit power allocation over a subset N of time slots, with N = {n|a(I)n > b
(I)
n , n ∈ N}.
In this case, problem (P2-I.2) is equivalently re-expressed as
(P2-I.3) : max
{p[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n])
s.t.
1
N
∑
n∈N
p[n] ≤ Pave (21a)
0 ≤ p[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n ∈ N . (21b)
The reformulated problem (P2-I.3) is convex and satisfies the Slater’s conditions [44]. There-
fore, this problem can be optimally solved by the Karush-kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [44].
Let υ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (21a), and λn and λn, n ∈ N
denote the Lagrange multipliers associated with p[n] ≥ 0 and p[n] ≤ Ppeak, respectively. Suppose
that the optimal primal and dual solutions to problem (P2-I.3) are given by {p∗[n]}, υ∗, {λ∗n},
and {λ
∗
n}, respectively. Then based on the KKT conditions, they should satisfy the following
sufficient and necessary conditions.
υ∗ ≥ 0, (22a)
υ∗

 1
N
∑
n∈N
p∗[n]− Pave

 = 0, (22b)
0 ≤ p∗[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n ∈ N , (22c)
λ∗n ≥ 0, λ
∗
n ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ N , (22d)
λ∗np
∗[n] = 0, ∀n ∈ N , (22e)
λ
∗
n(p
∗[n]− Ppeak) = 0, ∀n ∈ N , (22f)
1
ln 2
(
a
(I)
n
1 + a
(I)
n p∗[n]
−
b
(I)
n
1 + b
(I)
n p∗[n]
)
+ λ∗n − λ
∗
n = υ
∗, ∀n ∈ N . (22g)
Based on the above KKT conditions in (22) and after some manipulations, the optimal solution
to problem (P2-I.3) is given as
p∗[n] = min(Ppeak, p˜
∗[n]), ∀n ∈ N , (23)
where p˜∗[n] =
[
−a
(I)
n −b
(I)
n +
√
(a
(I)
n −b
(I)
n )
2
+4a
(I)
n b
(I)
n (
a
(I)
n −b
(I)
n
υ∗ ln 2
)
2a
(I)
n nb
(I)
n
]+
. By combining (23) with the fact that the
optimal p[n] should be zero for any n ∈ N \ N , it thus follows that the optimal solution to
problem (P2-I.2) is
p⋆[n] =

 p
∗[n], ∀n ∈ N ,
0, ∀n ∈ N \ N .
(24)
Notice that p∗[n]’s in (23) only depends on the optimal Lagrange multiplier υ∗, which can be
obtained via a bisection search based on 1
N
∑
n∈N p
∗[n] − Pave = 0.4 Therefore, the transmit
power allocation problem (P2-I.2) is finally solved optimally.
2) Trajectory Optimization: Next, we optimize the UAV trajectory {q[n], z[n]} under any
given transmit power allocation {p[n]}, for which the optimization problem is expressed as
(P2-I.4) : max
{q[n],z[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯(I) (q[n], z[n], p[n])
s.t. (13) and (14).
4Notice that υ∗ can become zero if
∑
n∈N Ppeak < NPave (or equivalently, the equality
1
N
∑
n∈N p
∗[n] − Pave = 0 cannot
be met). To avoid this case, we need to check whether
∑
n∈N
Ppeak < NPave holds before the bisection search.
By introducing a set of auxiliary variables {r[n]}, problem (P2-I.4) is equivalently reformu-
lated as the following problem:
(P2-I.5) : max
{q[n],z[n],r[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
r[n]
s.t. log2(1+γb(q[n], z[n], p[n]))−log2(1+γej(q[n], z[n], p[n])) ≥ r[n], ∀j ∈ J , n ∈ N
(13) and (14).
By further introducing auxiliary variables {ζk[n]} and {ηj[n]}, problem (P2-I.5) is equivalently
re-expressed as
(P2-I.6) : max
{q[n],z[n],r[n],ζk[n],ηj[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
r[n]
s.t. Rˆ
(I)
j (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) ≥ r[n], ∀j ∈ J , n ∈ N (25a)
ζk[n] ≥
(
||q[n]−wbk||
2 + z2[n]
)α
2 , ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N (25b)
ηj[n] ≤
(
||q[n]−wej ||
2 + z2[n]
)α
2 , ∀j ∈ J , n ∈ N (25c)
(13), (14),
where Rˆ
(I)
j (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) = log2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
β0p[n]
ζk[n]
)
− log2
(
1 + β0p[n]
ηj [n]
)
. Notice that each func-
tion Rˆ
(I)
j (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) in the left-hand-side (LHS) terms in constraint (25a) and the right-
hand-side (RHS) terms in constraint (25c) are convex with respect to {q[n], z[n]}, thus making
problem (P2-I.6) non-convex. To tackle the non-convexity issue, we apply the SCA technique
to obtain a converged solution in an iterative manner. At each iteration m ≥ 1, suppose that
the local trajectory point is given as {q(m)[n], z(m)[n]}. Then, we have the lower bounds for the
function Rˆ
(I)
j (ζk[n], ηj[n], p[n]) and the RHS terms of (25c) as follows based on the first-order
Taylor expansion.
Rˆ
(I)
j (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) ≥ Rˆ
(Im)
j (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) , log2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
β0p[n]
ζ
(m)
k [n]
)
− log2
(
1 +
β0p[n]
ηj[n]
)
−
1
ln 2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
β0p[n]
ζ
(m)
k [n]
)−1∑
k∈K
(
β0p[n]
ζ
(m)2
k [n]
(
ζk[n]− ζ
(m)
k [n]
))
, (26)
(
||q[n]−wej ||
2 + z2[n]
)α/2
≥ α
[
z(m)[n](z[n]− z(m)[n]) + (q(m)[n]−wej)(q[n]− q
(m)[n])
]
×
(
||q(m)[n]−wej||
2 + z(m)2[n]
)(α−2)/2
+
(
||q(m)[n]−wej||
2 + z(m)2[n]
)α/2
, E lbej
(I)
[n]. (27)
Replacing Rˆ
(I)
j (q[n], z[n], p[n]) and the RHS terms in (25c) as Rˆ
(Im)
j and E
lb
ej
(I)
[n], respectively,
problem (P2-I.6) is approximately expressed as the following convex optimization problem that
can be efficiently solved by CVX [45].
(P2-I.7.m) : max
{q[n],z[n],r[n],ζk[n],ηj [n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
r[n]
s.t. Rˆ
(Im)
j (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) ≥ r[n], ∀j ∈ J
ηj [n] ≤ E
lb
ej
(I)
[n], ∀j ∈ J , n ∈ N
(13), (14), and (25b).
Therefore, at iteration (m + 1), we update the UAV trajectory point {q(m+1)[n], z(m+1)[n]}
as the optimal solution to the approximate problem (P2-I.7.m), under the local trajectory point
{q(m)[n], z(m)[n]} in the previous iteration m. As the iteration converges, we can obtain an
efficient solution to problem (P2-I.5).
To sum up, we solve for the transmit power {p[n]} and the trajectory {q[n], z[n]} in an iterative
manner above, and accordingly, we obtain an efficient solution to problem (P2-I.1) or (P2-I).
As the objective value of problem (P2-I.1) is monotonically non-decreasing after each iteration
and the objective value of problem (P2-I.1) is finite, the proposed alternating optimization based
approach is guaranteed to converge [46]. In Section V, we will conduct simulations to show the
effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
Remark 4.1: It should be noticed that the performance of our proposed alternating-optimization-
based approach critically depends on the initial point for iteration. In this paper, we consider the
following fly-hover-fly trajectory as the initial point. In this design, for the horizontal trajectory,
the UAV first flies straightly at the maximum speed from the initial location to the top of one
GR, then hovers with the maximum duration, and finally flies straightly at the maximum speed
to the final location. We choose the hovering location as the point above the GR at the most
central point among these GRs. For the vertical trajectory, if the altitude of the initial location is
different from the final location, the UAV first flies at the maximum speed to reach the altitude
of the final location, then stays at this altitude in the rest of the mission duration.
B. Proposed Solution to (P2-II) for Colluding Eavesdroppers
In this subsection, we propose an efficient solution to problem (P2-II) for colluding eaves-
droppers. First, we handle the non-smoothness of the objective function of problem (P2-II). As
explained before, we omit the [·]+ operator in the objective function of (P2-II), and equivalently
re-express (P2-II) as the following problem:
(P2-II.1) : max
{q[n],z[n],p[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯(II) (q[n], z[n], p[n])
s.t. (13), (14), and (15),
where R¯(II) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) is defined in (18).
Next, we focus on solving the non-convex problem (P2-II.1), by using the alternating op-
timization method. In particular, we optimize the transmit power allocation {p[n]} and UAV
trajectory {q[n], z[n]} in an iterative manner, by considering the other to be given.
1) Transmit Power Allocation Optimization: First, we optimize the UAV’s transmit power
{p[n]} under given UAV trajectory {q[n], z[n]}, for which the optimization problem is expressed
as
(P2-II.2) : max
{p[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯(II) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) , s.t. (15).
Notice that under given {q[n]} and {z[n]}, R¯(II) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) can be re-expressed as follows
for notational convenience
R¯(II) (q[n], z[n], p[n]) = log2
(
1 + a(II)n p[n]
)
− log2
(
1 + b(II)n p[n]
)
, (28)
where a
(II)
n =
∑
k∈K
gbk (q[n], z[n]) and b
(II)
n =
∑
j∈J
gej (q[n], z[n]). Similar to problem (P2-I.2),
problem (P2-II.2) is equivalently re-expressed as
(P2-II.3) : max
{p[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈Nˆ
R¯(II) (q[n], z[n], p[n])
s.t.
1
N
∑
n∈Nˆ
p[n] ≤ Pave (29a)
0 ≤ p[n] ≤ Ppeak, ∀n ∈ Nˆ , (29b)
where Nˆ is a subset of time slots, with Nˆ = {n|a(II)n > b
(II)
n , n ∈ N}. Accordingly, the optimal
solution to problem (P2-II.3) obtained as {p∗∗[n]}, similarly as in (23), by replacing N , a(I)n , and
b
(I)
n as Nˆ , a
(II)
n , and b
(II)
n , respectively. Therefore, the transmit power allocation problem (P2-II.2)
is finally solved optimally.
2) Trajectory Optimization: Next, we optimize the UAV trajectory {q[n], z[n]} under any
given transmit power allocation {p[n]}, for which the optimization problem is expressed as
(P2-II.4) : max
{q[n],z[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
R¯(II) (q[n], z[n], p[n])
s.t. (13) and (14).
By introducing auxiliary variables {ζk[n]} and {ηj [n]}, problem (P2-II.4) is equivalently re-
expressed as
(P2-II.5) : max
{q[n],z[n],ζk[n],ηj [n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
Rˆ(II) (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n])
s.t. ζk[n] ≥
(
||q[n]−wbk||
2 + z2[n]
)α
2 , ∀k ∈ K, n ∈ N (30a)
ηj [n] ≤
(
||q[n]−wej||
2 + z2[n]
)α
2 , ∀j ∈ J , n ∈ N (30b)
(13), (14),
where Rˆ(II) (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) = log2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
β0p[n]
ζk [n]
)
− log2
(
1 +
∑
j∈J
β0p[n]
ηj [n]
)
. Notice that the
function Rˆ(II) (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) in the objective function and the RHS terms in constraint (30b)
are convex with respect to {q[n], z[n]}, making problem (P2-II.5) non-convex. To deal with this
issue, we apply the SCA technique to obtain a converged solution to problem (P2-II.5) in an
iterative manner. At each iteration m ≥ 1, suppose that the local trajectory point is given as
{q(m)[n], z(m)[n]}. Then, we have the lower bounds for the function Rˆ(II) (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) and
the RHS term of (30b) as follows based on the first-order Taylor expansion.
Rˆ(II) (ζk[n], ηj[n], p[n]) ≥ Rˆ
(IIm) (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n]) , log2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
β0p[n]
ζ
(m)
k [n]
)
− log2
(
1 +
∑
j∈J
β0p[n]
ηj[n]
)
−
1
ln 2
(
1 +
∑
k∈K
β0p[n]
ζ
(m)
k [n]
)−1∑
k∈K
(
β0p[n]
ζ
(m)2
k [n]
(
ζk[n]− ζ
(m)
k [n]
))
, (31)
(
||q[n]−wej||
2 + z2[n]
)α/2
≥ α
[
z(m)[n](z[n] − z(m)[n]) + (q(m)[n]−wej)(q[n]− q
(m)[n])
]
×
(
||q(m)[n]−wej||
2 + z(m)2[n]
)(α−2)/2
+
(
||q(m)[n]−wej||
2 + z(m)2[n]
)α/2
, E lbej
(II)
[n]. (32)
Replacing Rˆ(II) (ζk[n], ηj[n], p[n]) and the RHS terms in (30b) as Rˆ
(IIm) (ζk[n], ηj[n], p[n]) and
E lbej
(II)
[n], respectively, problem (P2-II.5) is approximately expressed as the following convex
optimization problem that can be efficiently solved by CVX [45].
(P2-II.6.m) : max
{q[n],z[n],ζk[n],ηj[n]}
1
N
∑
n∈N
Rˆ(IIm) (ζk[n], ηj [n], p[n])
s.t. ηj [n] ≤ E
lb
ej
(II)
[n], ∀j ∈ J , n ∈ N
(13), (14), and (30a).
Therefore, at iteration (m + 1), we update the UAV trajectory point {q(m+1)[n], z(m+1)[n]}
as the optimal solution to the approximate problem (P2-II.6.m), under the local trajectory point
{q(m)[n], z(m)[n]} in the previous iteration m. As the iteration converges, we can obtain an
efficient solution to problem (P2-II.4).
To sum up, we solve for the transmit power {p[n]} and the trajectory {q[n], z[n]} in an
iterative manner above, and accordingly, we obtain an efficient solution to problem (P2-II.1) or
equivalently (P2-II).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct numerical results to validate the performance of our proposed
designs. In the simulation, unless otherwise stated, we use the following settings: K = 3, J = 2,
wb1 = (−100 m, 300 m), wb2 = (0 m, 300 m), wb3 = (100 m, 300 m), we1 = (−50 m, 180 m),
we2 = (0 m, 180 m), q[0] = (−305 m, 800 m), q[N+1] = (−80 m,−200 m), z[0] = z[N+1] =
200 m, zmin = 150 m, zmax = 250 m, ts = 0.5 s, α = 2, V˜ = 25 m/s, V˜up = 4 m/s, V˜down = 6 m/s,
P = Pave = 30 dBm, Ppeak = 4Pave, β0 = −30 dBm and σ2 = −80 dBm.
A. Quasi-Stationary UAV Scenario
Figs. 2(a) and 2(b) show the obtained optimal UAV altitude to problems (P1-I.2) and (P1-
II.2) under different given horizontal locations for non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers.
It is observed that in both figures, when the UAV is located closer to GRs than eavesdroppers,
the UAV should stay at the lowest altitude to enjoy the strong legitimate communication link;
while when the UAV is located closer to eavesdroppers than GRs with medium distance, the UAV
should be deployed at the highest altitude to minimize the information leakage. It is also observed
that between the regions with lowest and highest altitudes, there exists a region where the UAV
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Fig. 2. Obtained optimal UAV altitude to problems (P1-I.2) and (P1-II.2) under different given horizontal location. The region
marked with + denotes that the optimal UAV altitude is at the lowest. The region marked with × denotes that the optimal UAV
altitude is at the highest. The blank region between the former two regions denotes that the optimal UAV altitude is between
the minimum and maximum values. The region marked with ◦ denotes that the secrecy rate becomes zero, regardless of the
UAV altitude.
should stay at an altitude between the lowest and highest values. Furthermore, it is observed
in Fig. 2(a) that with the non-colluding eavesdroppers, the secrecy rate is always positive even
when the UAV is located close to eavesdroppers. By contrast, it is observed in Fig. 2(b) that
with the colluding eavesdroppers, there exists a region where the secrecy rate becomes zero due
to the collaborative interception by colluding eavesdroppers.
Next, we consider problems (P1-I) and (P1-II) when both horizontal and vertical locations of
UAV are optimized jointly with the transmit power control. Fig. 3 shows the obtained optimal
horizontal locations of the UAV under non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, where the
optimal vertical locations are obtained as z⋆ = z⋆⋆ = zmin under this setup. It is observed
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Fig. 3. Obtained optimal horizontal location of UAV under non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers.
that under the same value of transmit power levels, the optimal horizontal location under
colluding eavesdroppers is farther away from the eavesdroppers than that under non-colluding
eavesdroppers, in order to better combat against the stronger collaborative interception. It is also
observed that as the transmit power increases, the optimal horizontal locations move farther away
from both GRs and eavesdroppers, to achieve a balance between the desirable signal strength at
GRs and undesirable information leakage at eavesdroppers.
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Fig. 4 shows the achieved secrecy rate versus the UAV’s maximum transmit power under both
non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. For comparison, we consider benchmark schemes
when the UAV is located at an optimized location with the received SNR at the GRs being
maximized. It is observed that under both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, our
proposed designs significantly outperform the benchmark schemes. It is also observed that
the achieved secrecy rate under non-colluding eavesdroppers is always larger than that under
colluding eavesdroppers. This is intuitive, as the colluding eavesdropping is more harmful than
the non-colluding one.
B. Mobile UAV Scenario
Next, we show the performance of our proposed designs in the mobile UAV scenario.
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Fig. 5. Obtained UAV horizontal trajectories by the proposed
design under non-colluding eavesdroppers, which are sampled
every 2.5 seconds.
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Figs. 5 and 6 show the obtained horizontal trajectories of the UAV for non-colluding and
colluding eavesdroppers by our proposed designs, under mission duration T = 41 s, T = 42 s,
and T = 50 s, respectively. When T is large (e.g., T = 50 s), the UAV is observed to hover at
an optimized point with longest duration. In particular, under non-colluding eavesdroppers, the
UAV is observed to fly straightly at the maximum speed from the hovering location to the final
location; while under colluding eavesdroppers, the UAV is observed to fly to the final location
following arc paths that are away from the eavesdroppers to avoid the collaborative information
interception. When T is small (e.g., T = 41 s and T = 42 s), the UAV is observed to fly at
the maximum speed towards the hovering location as close as possible, but they cannot exactly
reach there due to the time and speed limitations.
Figs. 7 and 8 show the obtained UAV altitude and transmit power under non-colluding and
colluding eavesdroppers by our proposed designs, under mission duration T = 41 s, T = 42 s,
and T = 50 s, respectively. Under both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers, it is observed
that when the UAV is closer to the GRs than the eavesdroppers, it drops its altitude to enhance
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Fig. 7. Obtained UAV altitude and transmit power over time
by our proposed designs under non-colluding eavesdroppers.
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Fig. 8. Obtained UAV altitude and transmit power over time
by our proposed designs under colluding eavesdroppers.
the desirable information transmission; by contrast, when UAV is closer to the eavesdroppers
than the GRs, it lifts its altitude and decreases the transmit power to prevent the undesirable
information leakage. This observation is generally consistent with our discussion in Remark 3.1,
which shows the optimized altitude behavior under given horizontal UAV location. In particular,
when the mission duration is short with T = 41 s, it is observed that there is no additional time for
the UAV to adjust the its horizontal trajectory, but it still can adjust its altitude for achieving better
communication performance. Furthermore, it is observed that under non-colluding eavesdroppers,
the UAV always has positive transmit power (thus positive secrecy rate) during its flight; while
under colluding eavesdroppers, the UAV sets its transmit power to be zero (thus leading to
zero secrecy rate) at certain points during its flight, especially when the UAV flies close to the
eavesdroppers.
Figs. 9 and 10 show the average secrecy rate versus the mission duration T for non-colluding
and colluding eavesdroppers, respectively. For comparison, we consider the following three
benchmark schemes.
• 2D trajectory design with adaptive power allocation: The UAV flies at a fixed altitude
z, and jointly optimizes its 2D horizontal trajectory and the transmit power allocation to
maximize the average secrecy rate. This design can be implemented by solving problem
(P2-I) or (P2-II) under given z. For this design, we set the fixed altitude as z = 200 m.
• Fly-hover-fly trajectory with adaptive power allocation: The UAV adopts the fly-hover-fly
trajectory in Remark 4.1, during which it adaptively optimizes the transmit power allocation
by solving problem (P2-I.2) or (P2-II.2).
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• Fly-hover-fly trajectory with constant power allocation: The UAV adopts the fly-hover-
fly trajectory in Remark 4.1, during which it employs the constant power allocation, i.e.,
p[n] = Pave, ∀n ∈ N .
It is observed that as T increases, the secrecy rates achieved by all the four schemes increase
under both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers. This is due to the fact that in this case,
the UAV can fly closer towards the hovering location and/or hover there with longer duration,
thus leading to higher average achievable secrecy rate. When T is small (e.g. T = 40 s), the 2D
trajectory design with adaptive power allocation is observed to have a similar performance as the
fly-hover-fly trajectory with adaptive power allocation. This is due to the fact that in this case, the
mission duration is only sufficient for the UAV to fly from the initial to final locations, and there is
no additional time to adjust the trajectory for communication performance optimization. When T
becomes large, the two schemes of 3D and 2D trajectory design with adaptive power allocation
are observed to significantly outperform the other two benchmark schemes with fly-hover-fly
trajectory under both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers scenarios. Furthermore, it is
observed that there is a large performance gap between the proposed 3D trajectory design with
adaptive power allocation versus the 2D trajectory design with adaptive power allocation. This
shows the significance of adapting the vertical UAV trajectory or altitude in enhancing the secrecy
UAV communication performance with CoMP reception.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered the CoMP reception-enabled secrecy UAV communication system,
in which multiple GRs cooperatively detect the legitimate information sent from the UAV to
enhance the legitimate communication performance under quasi-stationary and mobile UAVs
scenarios. By considering both non-colluding and colluding eavesdroppers under both scenarios,
we proposed to jointly exploit the UAV’s 3D maneuver and transmit power adaptation to
maximize the average secrecy rate. It is shown that the joint 3D maneuver and transmit power
optimization greatly enhances the secrecy performance, as compared to other benchmark schemes
with e.g. 2D maneuver optimization only. It is also shown that the 3D maneuver behaviors under
non-colluding and colluding eavesdropper scenarios are distinct. How to extend the results to
other scenarios, e.g., with multiple UAVs and multi-antenna GRs, are interesting directions worth
further investigation.
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